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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff, Judy Baxter, brought the action for 
the purpose of causing a dissolution of an alleged partner-
ship. Defendants deny any such partnership.did, or should, 
exist and counterclaim for damages resulting from .. the Plain-
tiff's continued use -of ·:real property· deeded to the Defendant 
Squaw Peak, Inc. by the Plaintiff and Warburton Investment. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff a twenty~five 
percent (25%) limited interest in the business to be conducted 
on the premises by the Defendants, including all the assets 
of the business. The Plaintiff was also awarded the use of 
a red brick home located on the premises. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Without specifically ruling on the admissibility 
of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 4, the trial court based its 
disposition of the case largely on these documents and the 
testimony of the Plaintiff in connection with these exhibits. 
The Defendants made repeated objections to the admissibility 
of these exhibits, and the testimony associated with them, 
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basing the objections upon the Statute of Frauds, the 
Doctrine of Merger, Parole Evidence and lack of consider-
ation. The Defendants seek to have this Court hold that 
these Exhibits and the accompanying testimony are inadmis-
sible, and direct the lower court to enter a finding that 
the Plaintiff has no interest in the real property conveyed 
by Plaintiff and another to Squaw Peak, Inc., nor in any 
other business assets of Squaw Peak, Inc. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff acquired the realty in question on 
July 1, 1977 for $150,000. Transcript of Trial, page 7. 
In January of 1978, the building on the premises, known as 
the Riverbend Lounge, burned down. The Plaintiff recovered 
$65,000 in insurance proceeds which went directly to reduce 
the prinicipal of the indebtedness, leaving $65,000 still 
owing. Transcript of· Trial, page 8. In order for the struc- ~ 
ture to ever be rebuilt, construction had to commence within 
one year from the fire; however, the Plaintiff was unable 
to obtain sufficient financing to provide for the structure 
to be rebuilt. Transcript of Trial, pages 8 and 9. 
The Plaintiff received three (3) offers to purchase:: 
the property, all of them generated by the Defendant, Tom 
Stubbs. Transcript of Trial, page 9. Apparently, no other 
2 
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parties were interested in the property. 
On November 1, 1978, the Plaintiff and Warburton 
Investment, a partnership, executed a Warranty Deed (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 3) as Granters, which conveyed the pro-
perty to the Defendant Squaw Peak, Inc. Transcript of Trial, 
pages 14 and 66. The Warranty Deed was then escrowed with 
Wasatch Bank until Squaw Peak, Inc._acquired a S.B.A. loan. 
The closing on the S.B.A. loan, and the final disbursements 
to the Plaintiff~ took place on April 3, 1979. Transcript 
of Trial, pages 14 and 67, also, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
The Warranty Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) is subject to 
certain easements and restructions [sic] of record and re-
quires the Grantee, the Defendant Squaw Peak, Inc., to pay 
the 1978 taxes. Pla~ntiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
The Plaintiff has received a total of $170,000 for 
the real property; $65,000 from insurance proceeds; $40,000 
by check when the,warranty Deed was placed in escrow with 
Wasatch Bank; and $65,000 when Warranty Deed was delivered 
by the escrow agent to Squaw Peak, Inc. on April 3, 1979. 
Transcript of Trial, pages 14, 31, 33, 41, 42, 59 and 67. 
The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Utah County Record-
er's Office ori'April 4, 1979. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
The proceeding facts include all the evidence, per-
tinent to this appeal, which the Appellants and Defendants 
3 
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believe to have been admissible. Some of the above-des-
cribed facts may also be inadmissible. In addition to the 
proceeding facts, the trial court heard the facts described 
below. 
An Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) was jointly prepared and exe-
cuted by·'the Defendant Torn Stubbs and the Plaintiff on 
September .5, 1978.as the initial contract concerning the 
conveyance of the property by the Plaintiff to the Defen-
dants. Transcript of Trial, page 9. Subsequent to the exe-
cution of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, 
the Defendant Torn Stubbs and the Plaintiff executed Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 2, purporting to create an interest in 
the ~Defendants' business and business assets (restaurant). 
Transcript of Trial, page 12. There is no evidence of con-
sideration for Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. 
The trial court also believed it was important that 
the Defendant Torn Stubbs had previously made another offer 
on. the property for $140,000. 
POINT I 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 4 are merged in 
Warranty Deed. 
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recog-
nizes, is applicable when the acts to be per-
4 
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POINT II 
The Earnest Money Receipt Does Not Survive The 
Execution And Delivery Of The Warranty Deed 
.The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, 
Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and 4, states: 
was held: 
It is understood and agreed that the terms 
written in this receipt constitute the entire 
preliminary contract ..•. It is further agreed 
that the execution of the final contract shall 
abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase. 
Interpreting these exact provisions, this Court 
The delivery and acceptance of a deed, executed 
pursuant to the provisions of a precedent con-
tract for the sale of real property, may merge 
rights conferred by the contract into it. Stip-
ulations in the prior contract, of which con- · 
veyance is not a performance, are superseded by 
the deed if the parties intended to surrender 
them. These principals are founded upon the 
privilege which parties always possess to change 
their contract obligations by further agreement 
prior to performance. 
Plaintiff also clearly demonstrated a lack 
of intention to perpetuate the option by sub-
sequently affixing this signature on the closing 
documents and accepting them and the deed of 
conveyance without equivocation. Bowen v. Olsen, 
576, P.2d 862, 864 (Utah, 1978) emphasis added. 
In the.case currently before the Court, the Plain~ 
tiff (seller) executed and caused the deed to be delivered 
without any reservation of any interest in the property, 
even though certain reservations were noted in the face of 
7 
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the deed, notably one which required grantee to pay all of 
1978 taxes, even though the Plaintiff's Deed was not exe-
cuted until November 1978 nor delivered until April 1979. 
The terms of Plaintiff's 'Exhibits No. 1 and 4 would have 
required a proration of the taxes; however, this pro-
tection for the Defendants was removed by the Plaintiff 
when she drafted the Warranty Deed. 
In Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 
(1966), this Court also addressed the abrogation clause in 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. In that 
opinion, the Court held a merger of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase did indeed occur. This Court 
found: 
We have difficulty seeing why a waranty deed 
to Hansen [Buyer] should not abrogate the pre-
liminary, loosely: drawn and almost incoherent·. 
Earnest Money Receipt, and thus merge what 
really amounted only to signed notes of a con-
templated future transaction for a deed, volun-
tarily executed subject to and actually recorded 
under conceded recording procedures, which was 
accomplished and sanctioned by legislative 
authority. Kelsey v. Hansen, supra, pp. 198-199. 
In Kelsey v. Hansen, supra, p. 199, this Court 
pointed out, "There might be cases that could cut through 
such a case, in equity, for fraud, mistake and the like ... " 
but such was not the case there, nor is the instant case 
such a case. 
8 
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POINT III 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 Lacks Consideration 
The testimony of the Plaintiff, and the represen-
tations made at trial by counsel for the Plaintiff, is that 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, referred to by the Plaintiff as 
the Addendum to the Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to 
Purchase, was executed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Tom Stubbs subsequent to the execution of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 
and 4) which "constitute the· entire preliminary contract." 
Transcript of Trial, page 12. On its face, Exhibit No. 2 
retains additional rights in the property, in favor of the 
Plaintiff, after conveyance by Plaintiff than does Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1. There is no consideration, however, 
flowing from the Plaintiff to any of the Defendants as a 
result of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. Without this con-
sideration, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 cannot be enforce-
able, even if one assumes that it survives the doctrine of 
merger. In addition, the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 4, purports to be 
the final preliminary modification,. must. clearly set forth 
that the ·modification· alters the original agreement. This 
is not the case. 
9 
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POINT IV 
Plaintiff Received Bargained For Consideration 
The testimony of the Plaintiff was that she was 
to.receive a twenty-five percent (25%) interest' in the new 
restaurant. In exchange for this interest the Defendants 
would be required to pay the Plaintiff only $40,000 of the 
agreed $105,000 sales price. The Plaintiff testified, 
"That's why they I the Defendants] didn't pay me [the Plain- _ 
'''Ll 
tiff] the full $105,000." That $65,000 was to be part of 
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in the new restaurant. 
''fo: 
Transcript of Tr~al, page 12. The Plaintiff later testified, 
that the full $105,000 was paid by the Defendants by paying 
the Plaintiff $40,000 and relieving the Plaintiff of a 
$65,000 obligation to Wasatch Bank. Transcript of Trial, 
page 31. The testimony of the Plaintiff is, therefore, 
~hat, .if the Defendants did not pay the full $105,000 pur-
chase price, she was to receive a twenty-five percent (25%) 
interest in·the restaurant business. However, she was paid 
the =full pruchase price. 
Furthermore,, the Plaintiff made a $20,000 profit 
on the property, which she held for approximately twenty-
two (22) months, even though the major structure on the 
premises was destroyed by fire during that period and the 
10 
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Plaintiff failed to have adequate insurance on the struc-
ture to rebuild it. If this Court allows the Plaintiff to 
retain a twenty-five percent (25%) interst in the property, 
she will have, by her testimony, made an additional $100,,000 
profit on the sale. Transcript of Trial, page 23. If the 
Plaintiff's figures are accurate, and a twenty-five percent 
(25%) interest in the property gives her $100,000 equity 
position in the property, the property is worth approxi-
mately $400,000 as bare ground. Knowing this, the Plaintiff 
nevertheless sold the property for $105,000. The reason 
the Plaintiff sold the property for $105,000 is because that 
is all it was worth asi.bare ground. The .. $100,000 equity she 
referred to is only something she has imagined. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff sold the Defendants real property 
at $105,000. All prior agreements were merged in the 
Warranty Deed. To the extent this Court determines they 
have not merged, the Plaintiff testified that she was to 
receive a twenty-five percent (25%) interest only if she 
was paid only $40,000. In fact, the Plaintiff received the 
full $105,000 purchase price. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, in addition to being 
merged in the Warranty Deed, lacks.consideration sufficient 
11 
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to make it a binding contract. 
The Defendants ask that all right, title and 
interest of the Plaintiff in the property be extinguished 
in favor of the Defendant Squaw Peak, Inc • 
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